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A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE
DELAWARE AND MARYLAND CLOSE
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EDwIN J. BRADLEY*
In 1967 both Delaware and Maryland enacted close corporation legis-
lation. The two statutes differ significantly in their approach to the
problems of the "incorporated partnership." In this article the author
undertakes an evaluation of the policies represented in the two enact-
ments and concludes that the Maryland effort yields the most insight-
ful close corporation statute legislated to date.
A PPLICATIoN of traditional business corporation laws to the close cor-
poration has produced two evils. Business associates have been deprived
of the right to use arrangements, vital from a practical point of view, for
allocating management of the business; for determining profit sharing; and
for structuring an effective decision-making process. Equally insidious has
been the devastating effect on minority shareholders of judicial tolerance
of the power conferred upon majority directors and shareholders by tra-
ditional corporation statutes. Because general corporation laws do not deal
satisfactorily with the problems of the close corporation, several states have
enacted special close corporation provisions. The most recent examples of
this trend are the 1967 enactments in Delaware and Maryland. The ap-
proach taken by these two states differs significantly, however. This article
will undertake a comparative policy evaluation of these latest legislative
efforts to rationalize the 'legal environment of the close corporation.1
LEGISLATIVE POLICY FOR CLOSE CORPORATIONS
It will be the author's thesis that close corporation legislation should be
animated by two fundamental principles. First, a very far-reaching con-
tractual freedom should be extended to business associates to structure the
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ultimate and day-to-day control of the business, to make arrangements for
allocation of the earnings and for asset distribution, and to establish ground
rules for the transfer of ownership interests and the dissolution of the cor-
poration. Secondly, legislation governing close corporations should give full
and explicit emphasis to other consequences of the contractual origin of
the close corporation and the fiduciary relationship of the -associates. While
close corporation statutes must rescue that institution from the planning
inhibitions impressed on it by blackletter-minded judges, the enactments
must also liberate minority participants from the prospect of control and
profit-sharing arrangements to which they did not freely assent. This goal
can be accomplished -partly, at least, by a legislative pattern marked by a
consistent and express demand for unanimity where creation or change of
the basic business arrangements is involved.
Complete effectuation of the reform, however, cannot be realized by a
legislative policy which permits the parties an unlimited choice in the
application of every provision intended for the close corporation. A defini-
tional approach which merely serves to limit the class of corporations eligi-
ble for choice of close corporation status does not give the needed assurance
that in all corporations which have the functional characteristics of the
close corporations, 2 the "freeze-out" or other oppression of -the minority
shareholders cannot occur. Thus, definition is properly employed to compel
conformity to legislatively-weighed operational standards.
Close corporation statutes should be completely permissive with respect
to how the business is to be run. Draftsmen must overcome the temptation
to pronounce mandatory procedures which the proponents believe are the
"best" way to run a close corporation or to outlaw procedures which are felt
to be "too flexible," for there is no "best" way to solve the planning prob-
lems in -a close corporation. Each solution must be tailor-made. Unfortu-
nately, draftsmen of close corporation statutes write against a background
FAr.o L. Rev. 481 (1962); Comment, Statutory Recognition of the Close Corporation
in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 569 (1964). See generally F. O'NEAL, 1 CLosE
ConRonAiioNs §§ 1.13-.14 (1958).
The Model Business Corporation Act remains in a retarded form as far as the
close corporation is concerned. The Act authorizes high vote requirements for share-
holders (§ 136) and directors (§ 37), and informal action by shareholders (§ 138)
and directors (§ 39A-Optional). Petitions for dissolution are allowed on an en-
larged basis by § 90. The most notable example of stunted growth is the continuing
insistence on three directors even in a one or two-man situation. The only hope until
the Model Act and its progeny are amended seems to be judicial enlightenment. See,
e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16,203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). But see Burnett v. Word,
Inc., 412 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) for a reiteration of old errors.
SThe. close corporation as it is found in the market place cannot be defined pre-
cisely, although corporations having very few stockholders all of whom are likely to
be active in the operation of the business and whose shares are subject to transfer
restrictions have been referred to as close corporations or incorporated partnerships.
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of judicial hostility which has occasionally led to a most convoluted and
overly-detailed statutory approach. The enactment of only sweeping gen-
eral principles precipitates ,the danger that courts will not enforce specific
arrangements, -and thus creates a lack of certainty which hampers effective
planning. For this reason, close corporation statutes should use straight-
forward, lucid declarations cataloging what may and may not be done
with respect to the important matters on which general corporation laws
have proved too inhibiting.
SUMMARY OF THE DELAWARE AND MARYLAND STATUTES
The Delaware statute. Delaware defines a close corporation as one
which disavows a public offering of its securities, restricts in some way the
transfer of its shares, places a limit on the number of its shareholders not
to exceed thirty3 (actually sixty),4 and recites in its certificate of incorpo-
ration that it is a close corporation. The application of close corporation
provisions is voluntary, however, for both new and existing corporations.5
A section of the Delaware statute not contained in the cose Corporation
Subehapter permits the utilization of only one or two directors in corpora-
tions which have, respectively, one or two shareholders.6 There is no close
corporation provision specifically permitting so few directors where -the
number of shareholders exceeds one or -two, although the broad license
found in section 354 to adopt partnership-like arrangements relating to
the management of the close corporation business perhaps authorizes the
use of a single managing director irrespective of the number of shareholders.
Shareholder voting agreements between two or more shareholders are legal-
ized in section 218, another non-close corporation provision, but they are
limited in time to ten years. Enforcement of voting agreements by the
grant of specific performance is a matter for .the courts and remains un-
settled.7 Irrevocable proxies, which may provide an 'alternative to the
enforcement uncertainty of shareholder agreements, are described in sec-
tion 212(c) as -those which are both stated to be irrevocable and coupled
with an interest sufficient in law -to support an irrevocable power. The
interest need not be in the stock itself but, in accordance with subsection C,
may be in the corporation generally.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342, 343 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
See id. § 342(a)(1), (c). Section 342(c) permits stock held jointly, in common,
or by the entireties,'to be attributed to one stockholder.
v Id. § 344.
0 Id. § 141(b).
7 In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947), the Delaware Supreme Court appears to have refused
specific performance of the promise to vote stock in unison as the parties would
decide or as determined by arbitration. The court merely nullified votes cast in con-
travention of the shareholder agreement.
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Three sections of the Close Corporation Subchapter deal with control
and profit sharing matters crucial in the close corporation:
(a) Section 350 allows a majority of the shareholders to agree in a
manner which restricts director discretion.
(b) Section 354 permits agreements "among stockholders" (whether
this means any two, a majority, or unanimity is not stated) -relating to any
phase of corporation affairs, including management of the business, divi-
dends, employment and arbitration. The fact that such agreements are
tantamount to efforts to treat the corporation as a partnership is negatived
as a ground for invalidation.
(c) Section 351 permits all of the shareholders to dispense with the
board of directors and accept the management and control of the business
by the stockholders directly. Under such an arrangement the stockholders
are deemed to be directors. Shareholder direct control may be terminated,
however, by vote of a majority of all of the shareholders, voting or not.
Since -this provision is unqualified, a higher vote requirement apparently
may not be invoked for the purpose of terminating direct shareholder
control.
While a two-thirds vote may voluntarily terminate close corporation
status by effectuating an amendment of the charter eliminating any re-
quired provision, such as the limitation on the number of shareholders, 8 a
higher vote may be stipulated. Involuntary termination by a transfer of
stock to unqualified shareholders or a transfer which would cause the num-
ber of shareholders to exceed the statutory limit can be effectively pre-
vented from disqualifying the corporation under section 347 by the opera-
tion of saving notice provisions and those permitting correction by the
corporation. While provision is made for shareholder petitions to appoint
a custodian on the occasion of board or shareholder deadlock, dissolution
is a discretionary form of relief.9 Section 355 allows a provision in the
certificate of incorporation -for dissolution at the option of one shareholder
or any specified number of shares. No buy-out option is conferred on
other shareholders to stave off dissolution, nor is the court granted that
discretionary flexibility. However, in the alternative, section 353 permits
a court to appoint a "provisional director" on the petition of one-half of
the board, one-third of the voting shares, or two-thirds of any other stock
class, when the business of the corporation "can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of the stockholders generally."
Transfers of securities may be restricted beyond common law toler-
ances. For example, consent restrictions are allowed. 10 If a restriction is
I See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 345(a), 346 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet
1967).
Old. §§ 226, 352.
OId..4 202 (c) (3).
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held to be invalid, section 349 gives the corporation a thirty day option to
buy the shares at a fair price.
The Maryland statute. The outstanding policy feature of the Maryland
statute is the consistent requirement of unanimity among all of the share-
holders for action which initiates or changes arrangements of fundamental
importance in the close corporation. A salient provision makes clear that
whenever the statute specifies -the assent of "all of the stockholders," no
shares may be made non-voting by agreement of the parties." Maryland
defines a close corporation as one which describes itself that way in a
charter provision to which every shareholder has consented. 12  Once at-
tained, such status may be lost only by unanimous consent.1 3 Hence, in
Maryland, close corporation legislation is inapplicable unless the parties
freely choose the close corporation as a distinct form. And they may
freely make that choice without having -to demonstrate eligibility on the
basis of either -the number of stockholders of the corporation or the extent
of trading in its stock.
In section 101 of its dose corporation statute, Maryland adopts the
partnership rule of delectus personarum, making a transfer of shares in-
valid unless it is consented to by all the stockholders or is consistent with
an agreement entered into by every member of that group. The stock-
holder who is blocked from sale by an inability to obtain consent, albeit
reasonably withheld, is entitled to require dissolution, absent an agreement
to the contrary, as is the stockholder to whom an unsatisfied purchase
commitment has been made.'4 New stock may not be issued unless all the
stockholders consent; nor may the close corporation issue options, con-
vertible securities, or voting debt securities. 15
All of the shareholders of the close corporation may agree upon a wide
range of matters including management, stock transfer restrictions, voting,
directorships, dividends or division of profits, employment, and dissolu-
tion.16 The courts are exhorted to specifically enforce these agreements
and are empowered to order dissolution where appropriate. Under section
105, utilization of a board of directors may be dispensed with altogether
by the associates, and management power may be directly exercised by
them. However, the more familiar director -approach may be preserved
by taking advantage of the section 106 permission to have a single director
where there is only one shareholder or, if there is more than one share-
holder, where a single director suits the business plan and agreement. Dis-
11 Mi. ANx. CODE art. 23, § 103(a) (Supp. 1967).
I2 1d. § 100(a).
'Id. § 100(b).
"Id.
"Id. § 102.
"Id. § 104.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
solution may be sought by any stockholder through judicial petition on the
ground that internal dissension prevents conduct of the business to the
advantage of all the stockholders.' 7 Increases in the number of share-
holders will not spoil the close corporation status, for there is no numerical
limitation in the definition.
THE FUNCTION OF A STATUTORY DEFINITION
Unanimity as the sole definitive factor: Maryland. Maryland defines
a close corporation as one which is identified as such in the charter. For
new corporations this will require consent by all; for existing corporations,
a unanimous vote of all of the stockholders, whether ordinarily entitled to
vote or not, is required. 18 Removal of the charter statement conferring
close corporation status may be accomplished only by charter amendment
consented to by all the stockholders.' 9 One desirable consequence of this
procedure is that status as a stockholder of a close corporation cannot be
thrust upon a stockholder nor can that status be terminated rightfully ex-
cept in the manner agreed upon by each stockholder. Since the mercantile
equivalence of the partnership and close corporation have long been recog-
nized, the legal equivalence of the basic contractual character of each re-
lationship is properly recognized as well. On the other hand, when close
corporation status may be freely chosen, as in Maryland, a person who
participates in -the routine incorporation of a business, or buys into a busi-
ness with non-close corporation status, expecting to exercise a meaningful
voice in management of the business, may well discover that change lies
within the power of others. This power includes the means through which
election under the new statute can be blocked, thereby leaving the business
association under the traditional corporate law provisions with their failure
of accommodation of the minority interest. It is noteworthy that a Mary-
land case, DeBoy v. Harris,20 held a charter amendment to be in violation
of the parties' joint-venture "understanding" that no changes would be
made in the capital proportions. The oral -agreement was held to survive
incorporation and to transcend, in legal effect, the provisions of the statute
or charter amendment. Now that Maryland has a close corporation stat-
ute, does ,the failure to elect that status deprive the parties in existing close
corporations of this and other protections against misuse of majority power?
For example, -now that the DeBoy v. Harris holding has been codified in
section 102 of the Maryland statute, does that rule apply only to close
corporations? Hopefully not. Since Maryland's close corporation regu-
latory provisions are applicable on a strictly voluntary basis, its courts must
.7Id. § 109.
-81d. § 100(a).
"Id. § 100(b).
20207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955).
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remain alert in order to protect the minority shareholder of non-electing
close corporations.
Maryland allows high-shareholder and director quorum and voting
provisions for the non-electing corporation.2 1 Three directors are invari-
ably required.2 2 The articles may impose restraints on stock transfers but
section 4(c) provides only that the restriction may not be "inconsistent
with law," thus enabling the courts to nullify "unreasonable restraints."
Since the statute says -nothing of irrevocable proxies, common law princi-
ples will apply. This whole arrangement gives the courts the widest possi-
ble supervision of the non-close corporation and allows them to guard
against misuse of majority power in the non-electing close corporation as
well. The ideal corporation statute, however, should go so far as to pro-
tect parties who become business associates under a routine, unplanned
incorporation by functionally defining the close corporation to encompass
all associations in which the potentiality for significant minority suppression
exists. The legislative purpose would be to establish for the close corpo-
ration, statutorily defined, the principle of free choice of associates, and
to outlaw less than unanimous shareholder agreements affecting control or
impinging on director functioning or discretion. These things and more
are done in Maryland for the electing corporation, but there is no effective
regulation of the non-electing corporation. 2 3
Corporations now in existence whose majority stockholders will resist
the election because they enjoy the upperhand are unaffected by the Mary-
land statute. Similarly untouched are those formed in the future with too
much optimism or without benefit of sound legal advice and planning for
all the participants. The mandatory application of certain statutory pro-
visions to all close corporations, as defined, will not prevent either un-
planned situations nor will it force unwanted arrangements on all partici-
pants in these enterprises. Charter provisions prerequisite to election of
that status generally and the use of the various statutory devices would
remain for optional use but only by unanimous consent. Thus, it is felt
that close corporation statutes may be made permissive enough to allow
business associates to choose a highly conventional and traditional approach
21MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 41, 42, 56 (1966).
2"Id. § 53.
"In Honikman v. Ruedd, Inc., 363 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1966), a holder of 25%
of the stock of a "Close Corporation" under the Florida statute, sought an order
voiding a charter amendment which increased authorized capital. The stockholder
urged the absence from the charter of a provision for amendment. The court rou-
tinely applied Florida general statutory charter amendment provisions to uphold
the change. Unfair treatment of a minority shareholder should be made impossible
by applying certain statutory provisions, such as the one in Maryland forbidding
issuance of new stock without unanimous consent, to all close corporations as defined.
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to corporate life virtually along the lines of the hornbook corporate char-
acteristics, but the burden should be on associates to plan for that kind
of corporation on a unanimous, contractual basis.
Definitional factors in the Delaware statute. In defining the close
corporation, the Delaware statute has departed from the trading or quota-
tion test of other statutes24 but has substituted an equally elusive and un-
certain element in the form of a ban on a "public offering." 25 The pavlovian
response of the corporate bar to that expression will be "twenty-five offer-
ees." However, another definitional component in the statute tolerates sixty
shareholders and, thus, at least that number of offerees. 26 What is not
clear is why the concept of investor protection should be allowed to intrude
into this area at all. The purchaser of shares of stock can be easily pro-
tected, and has been in this very statute, without resort to this definitional
foray. It has yet to be demonstrated how investors are threatened by the
wide availability of a business organization which admits of complete lati-
tude in its government and otherwise sharply departs from the classic con-
tours of the corporation, especially if unanimity is a pervasive requirement.
Definitions such as the one in Delaware, which represent a policy of
containment of the close corporation, presumably result from a finding that
the arrangements permitted "won't work" in a corporation that cannot
fit the definition. Or is -a finding made that in these non-qualifying cor-
porations -the parties "wouldn't want" them? These decisions would seem
properly left to the parties themselves. Since there is no exact, functional
distinction between the close and non-close corporation, the statutory line
between -them should not be so abruptly drawn that the stockholders and
managers of the corporation which fails to meet the definition are saddled
with all the management stringencies of the conventional corporation
statute.
In any case, -the Delaware definitional elements do not in fact sharply
curtail the use of close corporation control and management devices in
non-qualifying corporations. Nor are they used to insist that all statutorily-
defined close corporations comply with prescribed rules for the use of
"See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.0100(2) (Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
73(b) (1965); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 620(c) (McKinney Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-16.22(c) (Supp. 1965). A test based on whether the corporation's shares
are regularly traded or quoted was reportedly believed to be too elusive for practical
use and application. See E. ForL, THE NEw DELAwAmE CORpORATION LAw (Cor-
poration Service Company) 40-41 (1967).
'* DEL. CODE Am. tit. 8, § 342(3) (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
0' See id. § 342(a) (1), (c); note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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arrangements which may be harmful to minority shareholders. Eligible
Delaware corporations which do not elect, and ineligible Delaware corpora-
tions, are given wide planning latitude since Delaware section 102(b) (1)
may well insure to all corporations the contractual freedom conferred on
the close corporation. That section states:
Mhe certificate of incorporation may also contain . . . (1) Any pro-
vision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the
affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting
and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stock-
holders, or any class of the stockholders.... if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State....
The Delaware act also specifically permits the following for the non-close
corporation: one or two directors if there are as many shareholders [sec-
tion 141(b)]; high director quorum and vote requirements [section
141(b)]; informal director action [section 141(f)]; broad delegation to
committees [section 141(c)]; selection of the officers and agents by the
shareholders [section 142(a), (b)]; stock transfer restrictions of the most
stringent variety [section 202]; irrevocable proxies [section 212]; high
shareholder quorum and voting requirements [section 216]; voting trusts
and shareholder action [section 218]; informal shareholder action [section
228]; liberal dissolution of joint venture corporations [section 273]; peti-
tions for dissolution upon deadlock [section 226]. Thus, a workable close
corporation statute exists for all corporations regardless of the number of
shareholders, stock transfer restrictions, or public offerings, although it is
true that in Delaware, as in New York,27 a legislative effort is made to
confine the use of direct shareholder management to the statutorily defined
close corporation.2 8 Delaware also limits the use of partnership-like agree-
ments, arrangements Testricting director discretion, and the shareholder
dissolution option to the defined class of corporations. 29 Nevertheless, be-
cause the manifold measures -listed -above are available to corporations
which will not or cannot meet the statutory definition of a close corpora-
tion, the careful planner will be able to serve his client's needs adequately.
Consequently, the intricate Delaware provisions for guarding the close
corporation's status seem hardly worth the effort.
Election in existing corporations of close corporation status. The close
corporation form of business organization, often called an "incorporated
partnership," should be largely equated to the partnership wherever feasi-
ble and should be subject to fundamental contract principles. This would
mean that a stockholder must consent to the arrangements constituting the
close corporation status-whether that classification was consciously under-
"'See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 620(c) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
"
8 See DEL. CoDy ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
"'See id. § 341.
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taken or imposed by law. Moreover, some stockholders of an existing
corporation should not be given statutory sanction for imposing a new
status on dissenting shareholders, at least not without appraisal rights. Yet,
under Delaware section 344, the vote of the holders of two-thirds of the
shares of stock of each class in an existing corporation seems to have been
the intended basis to achieve close corporation status.
An impediment to achieving close corporation status without unanimous
assent has been written into the Delaware statute, although apparently it
was not intended. This "loophole" should -protect the dissenting stock-
holder of an existing dose corporation from unwanted and oppressive
arrangements made possible through close corporation election by a two-
thirds vote. As a prerequisite to close corporations status, a Delaware
charter must restrict the transfer of all of the issued stock in one or more
of the ways permitted by section 202. Section 202(b) states that no re-
striction shall be binding "with respect to securities issued prior to the
adoption of the restriction unless the holders of the securities ...voted
in favor of -the restriction." Thus, the objection of any shareholder to the
election of close corporation status may make a purported election legally
ineffective even though the two-thirds class vote requirement of section
344 is met.
If this "loophole," for some reason not evident, is not effective to
block the election, what protection exists for the minority? Could the
close corporation election be blocked in existing corporations having a
shareholder unanimity requirement for charter amendments? Perhaps not.
Section 341 states that unless a corporation elects to become a close corpo-
ration "in the manner prescribed in -this subchapter," it shall be subject -to
the general provisions of the corporation statute. A court might find that
section 344's -provision for a two-thirds vote presents a binding statutory
norm for the procedure which must be followed to achieve close corpora-
tion status. Yet, there is no good reason, except wholly irrelevant ideas
about the inefficiency of unanimity, to insist on -the preeminence of the
two-thirds majority provision over an existing unanimity agreement. In
any case, if there is no high vote requirement in an existing corporation, the
electing amendment is possible unless a shareholder is also a director and
is able to block the required board resolution because of a high vote re-
quirement under section 141(b).
Section 354 permits far reaching "partnership" type arrangements re-
specting management, dividends, employment, and arbitration "among the
stockholders," by written agreement, bylaw, or certificate provision. What
does "among the stockholders" mean? If two-thirds of the stockholders
elect close corporation status, a majority may be able to agree to a host of
provisions pursuant to section 354, and presumably those charter provi-
sions would be valid and enforceable. Curiously, the section 351 permis-
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sion for management by the shareholders imposes, as a condition prece-
dent,, consent of all holders of record, subscribers, incorporators and of .all
the outstanding stock, voting or not. Then, quite inconsistently and in-
comprehensibly, the section permits the certificate to be amended by ma-
jority vote eliminating this provision for shareholder management. Thus,
by reserving in the majority the power to destroy a management structure
to which it previously had acquiesced, the statute effectively insures ulti-
mate control to that group, and transforms the unanimity requirement of
section 351 into a trap for the unwary minority.
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS
Shareholder voting agreements, voting trusts, irrevocable proxies: A
continuing conundrum in Delaware. Section 218(c) of the Delaware
statute, one of the general corporation provisions, validates voting trusts
or written agreements between two or more shareholders with respect to
their voting rights, but only for -ten years. The provisions of the typical
voting trust statute on disclosure are necessary and desirable to protect
public investors, and the typical -ten year time limitation for the voting
trust may be needed to avoid control -abuse -and to protect against man-
agerial inefficiency. Hence, section 218 is needed for the non-close cor-
poration to validate and regulate voting trusts and shareholder agreements,
the latter being the functional equivalent of the voting trust when irrevoca-
ble proxies are attached. However, the section should not have been made
applicable to the close corporation, for it offends the basic principle that
in the close corporation there should be an equal opportunity to participate
in important matters affecting control and the distribution of earnings.
Further, the section, if it must 'apply to the close corporation as it is made
to do, introduces a reactionary rigidity by imposing a ten-year limitation
on shareholder voting agreements. Equating the voting trust and the
irrevocable-proxy shareholder agreement is obviously cogent; but the cor-
rect compromise, accommodating the -attributes of each, is to lift the time
limitation from the voting trust-not to impose one on the shareholder
voting agreement. 30
There is an aspect of this matter which does create a real statutory
drafting problem. The use of the voting trust or shareholder agreement
can be oppressive to a minority shareholder even if a ten-year limitation
is imposed. Under the approach of all close corporation statutes to date,
the application of the statute to the close corporation is not automatic;
the parties must choose that status. But only by defining the close corpo-
11 The New York scheme presents a desirable alternative, for under that state's
statute no limitation is imposed on the close corporation shareholder agreement, N.Y.
Bus. Coiu. LAw § 620(a) (McKinney 1963), and use of an irrevocable proxy is
authorized, id. § 609(f).
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ration precisely, and by making certain close corporation provisions ap-
plicable to it, is it possible, for example, to eliminate the oppressive use
of the voting trust or shareholder agreement in such corporations. A
unanimity requirement for both will serve that end in such a statutory
pattern.
Perhaps the most astonishing -thing about section 218 of the Delaware
statute is its perpetuation of the uncertainty over what is a voting trust as
compared to a shareholder voting agreement which utilizes irrevocable
proxies. The Ringling3l and Abercrombie 2 cases created this frustrating
conundrum,3 3 and the distinction is still necessary because certain steps
must be taken to create -a voting trust-transfer of the shares to the trustee
and filing the voting trust agreement at the corporation's principal place
of business-which are unnecessary for the formation of a shareholder
voting agreement. 34 Delaware cases insist on compliance with the statu-
tory preconditions whenever the substance of an arrangement makes it a
voting trust. Since no policy compels a distinction between the two, it
would have been preferable to abolish the statutory differentiation. If
non-participating shareholders have a legitimate need to know of the crea-
tion of the voting trust, it would appear that they should be made aware
of -the formation of a voting pool. The investor should also know that the
shares he buys are subject to a voting agreement just as the statute assures
that he will be informed of the voting trust when a voting trust certificate
is tendered -to him. The Delaware statute, however, does not take this
approach; the voting trust remains subject to the stock transfer and filing
requirements while the voting agreement remains free of these conditions. 35
Shareholder agreements and voting trusts in Maryland. Section 45 of
the Maryland corporation statute, which is a non-close corporation provi-
sion, allows one or more shareholders to form a voting trust for a period
not to exceed ten years, but any other shareholder may become a party to
it and participate in the "privileges of such agreement," whatever that may
mean. Presumably, this open-endedness would nullify any attempt by
less than all of the shareholders to use a voting trust as an oppressive
mechanism. Close corporation shareholder voting agreements are pro-
vided for in section 104(a) (4) and require the actual -assent of all share-
holders. Specific enforcement and dissolution provisions of section 104(d)
'
1 Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del.
Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
"Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956), rev'd in part,
130 A.2d 338 (1957).
33 See Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. LU. 1145, 1167-75 (1966).
1, Compare DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a) (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamph-
let 1967), with id. § 218(c).
"See id. § 218(a), (c).
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make resort to a voting trust unnecessary to overcome the common law
enforcement uncertainty concerning shareholder agreements. Moreover,
no time limitation is placed upon a shareholder voting agreement in the
Maryland statute.
Irrevocable proxies. While the Maryland statute is silent with respect
to irrevocable proxies, such an arrangement may not be needed as a close
corporation planning device when other workable options are available as
under the Maryland provisions. For example, where all of the share-
holders assent, section 104 of the Maryland statute authorizes, and pro-
vides for enforcement of, shareholder voting agreements which have no
time limitation. The Delaware irrevocable proxy section is almost super-
fluous, on the other hand, since it does no more than echo the hornbook
principle.3 6 Yet, it will probably be possible to plan around the irrevoca-
ble proxy uncertainty in Delaware. Although reliance on shareholder
voting agreements will not be fully satisfactory because of the ten-year time
limitation, -the planner may be served adequately by a section 350 agree-
ment restricting director discretion, or a section 351 shareholder agreement
relating to management, or a section 354 '"partnership" type agreement
regulating "the election of directors or officers or the employment of
stockholders." Enforcement is another matter, however, since a leading
Delaware case refused specific performance of a shareholders' voting
agreement.37
Classes of stock. Both the Delaware and Maryland statutes enable the
parties to create classes of stock by -appropriate charter clauses and to
endow each class with enumerated rights, powers, preferences or designa-
tions. 38 The Maryland statute specifically refers to voting powers and
voting rights of each class.39 Delaware's section 151(a) speaks of "voting
powers, full or limited, or no voting powers." There is mild uncertainty
about just how far these provisions permit the parties to go. The New
York statute is clearer in stating that the certificate may provide for the
election of one or more directors by the holders of the shares of -any class
or series of stock, or the holders of bonds.40
Agreements restricting director discretion. Section 350 of the Dela-
ware statute expressly allows a majority of the stockholders to make agree-
ments which restrict director discretion. Agreements parceling out the
corporate offices, allocating its profits -through salaries -and bonuses, shap-
'0 Id. § 212(c).
17 Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del.
Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
"See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(a) (4), 151(f) (Spec. General Corp. Law
Pamphlet 1967); MD. AlNN. CODE art. 23, §§ 4(b)(5), (b)(6), (c)(1); 18 (a)(1)
(Supp. 1967).
30 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 §§ 4(b)(6), 18(a)(1) (Supp. 1967).
,0 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 703 (a) (McKinney 1963).
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ing its dividend policy, and otherwise determining the management and
control of the business of the corporation are sanctioned, even though
some of the stockholders are excluded from them. Yet, since the actual
language provides only that the agreement is not invalid "as between the
parties to the agreement," courts may be able -to prevent the use of this
section to freeze out minority shareholders by refusing to sustain the agree-
ment in the face of a protest by'a non-participant in the -arrangement. The
court's hand may be strengthened if it resorts to section 354 which makes
clear that arrangements that are -appropriate for -a partnership may be
entered into "by the stockholders." Since "by the stockholders" may be
read as meaning all of the stockholders, partnership-like arrangements
among less than all of the shareholders could be nullified as outside of
this section.
Management by the shareholders. Section 351 of the Delaware stat-
ute authorizes a certificate of incorporation provision conferring business
management on -the stockholders rather than the board of directors. This
step may be taken only by charter amendment consented to by all stock-
holders -and subscribers. Yet, the shareholder management provision may
be deleted by a majority vote. After eliminating shareholder management,
the majority may proceed under sections 350 and 354 to erect arrange-
ments which constitute a classic "freeze-out." It is indeed surprising to
discover in a close corporation statute a legislatively supplied blueprint for
the entrapment-like exclusion of minority shareholders from the organic
control arrangement of the corporate business. In light of the majority's
unqualified statutory right to jettison management, no such arrangement
would be advisable when planning for protection of the interests of the
minority. Since the operational scheme to be utilized upon suspension of
shareholder management must be agreed to in advance, this other agree-
ment might as well be used from the beginning. Use of the shareholder-
management privilege is also unnecessary from a practical viewpoint when
there are two stockholders or factions, as in a fifty-fifty share-split situation,
for two directors -and two classes of stock, along with the agreements per-
mitted under sections 350 and 354, will serve well enough -as the control
arrangement.
Section 105 of the Maryland statute seems to permit management by
the shareholders only along lines traditionally associated with board of
director functioning. While the power to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation may be lodged in the shareholders as a body, it must
be exercised by them in a manner involving meetings, quorums, and voting
majorities. Of course, special voting requirements may be agreed upon,
but a fully open-ended statutory right to allocate ultimate managerial
power seems to be lacking in the approach taken by section 105. Subsec-
tion (6) is important -for it provides that action by stockholders "shall be
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taken by the voting of shares of stock as provided in this article." Prolix
and ingeniously drawn charter provisions, together with other devices,
might enable counsel to satisfy this requirement -and still supply his clients
with the allocation of managerial autonomy desired. Close incorporators,
however, should be freed entirely from any statutory "norm" with respect
to the distribution of managerial power. Suppose, for example, that busi-
ness associates desire to confer absolute autonomy over one segment of the
business upon a particular shareholder or agent while giving yet another
shareholder or agent full power over a separate phase of the business. The
Maryland statute does not establish dearly enough the legality of planning
along these lines. Hopefully, section 104, which sustains stockholder
agreements regulating "any aspect of the affairs" of the corporation in-
cluding "management of the business" and the "exercise or division of
voting power," will be used to validate arrangements of this kind.4
The Delaware statute may be sufficient on this point. The most con-
fining provision in Delaware is subsection (2) of section 351, which states
that the stockholders shall 'be deemed 'to be directors for purposes of ap-
plying the provisions of the corporation chapter. This may be read as
requiring the shareholders to exercise their power as a body in a some-
what formal manner. Section 354 may rescue the shareholders from this
situation, however, for it provides that written stockholder agreements or
charter or by-law provisions relating to the management of the business
shall not be invalid on -the ground that the parties have sought to arrange
their relations in a manner that would be appropriate among partners.
STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
Transfer of ownership interests in the close corporation. The Maryland
statute's basic position on stock transfer by stockholders of the close cor-
poration constitutes a marked reversal of philosophy from the traditional
hornbook free-alienability premise. The new Maryland position, codified
in section 101(a), is that shares of stock in a close corporation cannot be
transferred without the consent of the other stockholders, unless otherwise
agreed. This recognition of the functional equivalence of the close corpo-
ration and the partnership is, of course, an adoption of the partnership
rule.42 The shareholders of a Maryland close corporation may themselves
agree on the consequences of a withheld consent, whether "reasonable" or
otherwise, but the statute gives the stockholder who is denied consent the
" A preferable provision could have been borrowed from N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw
§ 620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1967). In pertinent part that section states: "A provision
[shall be valid which] transfers to one or more shareholders or to one or more persons
or corporations ... all or any part of [the] management [of the business of the cor-
poration] otherwise within the authority of the board ... "'
2 See UN oRm PAPrNERsimp AcT § 31 (1) (c); text preceding note 14 supra.
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right, absent a contrary agreement, to require dissolution.43 The same
right, which appears to be automatic and non-discretionary, is extended to
a stockholder who is party to an agreement on transfer restrictions if there
is a default on a purchase obligation created by the agreement.
Suppose a majority shareholder wishes to transfer his interest. If there
is -no contractual deviation from the statutory provision which prohibits
transfers without consent, the minority may withhold consent. If they do
so, they cannot prevent dissolution by the majority holder. Thus, if the
minority cannot finance their own purchase, forcing the majority to dis-
solve the entity may be their only way to stop a transfer to someone who
is unacceptable as a business associate. Suppose, on the other hand, that
a minority shareholder wishes to sell -his interest.4 The minority share-
holder who is able to come up with a bona fide offer -to purchase his shares
and who is denied consent, absent other agreement, may pursue his statu-
tory right to automatic dissolution unless one or more stockholders elect to
purchase his shares pursuant to section 109(c).
The treatment of transfer restrictions in the Delaware statute seems
incomplete. Section 202, which is applicable -to all corporations, makes
licit the imposition of restrictions on the transfer of securities such as those
employing the first option, compulsory buy-sell or buy-out, consent, trans-
feree-qualification, and subchapter S-motivated arrangements, as well as
any other lawful restriction. Section 349 gives the corporation a thirty-
day option to purchase the shares at their fair value if a restriction is held
not to be -authorized by section 202, which seems highly unlikely.
As noted, the Maryland statute introduces a way to deal with the situa-
tion where consent -to transfer is sought and not obtained. The hard
question of -whether the refusal must be "reasonable" or "in good faith" is
obviated by providing the would-be transferor with an automatic dissolu-
tion or buy-out remedy which is open to agreements enabling the share-
holders to transfer on a more liberal basis or to waive the dissolution right.
Thus, in Maryland stockholders may agree that consent may be withheld
arbitrarily with no avenue of escape, as in a partnership, or they may con-
struct whatever -arrangement they see fit. The Delaware statute, however,
seems less flexible. One able commentator has written -that, presumably,
"3See MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 101(b) (Supp. 1967).
"The practical difficulties associated with the sale of minority close corporation
stock should be diminished by the careful statutory scheme which makes the classic
freeze-out impossible in a Maryland close corporation. Since minority shares must
be party to and have a powerful voice in changing the management and profit ar-
rangements of a close corporation under the Maryland statute, purchase by an outsider
becomes more feasible. Close corporation stock, under a statute safeguarding the
rights of all stockholders as contracting parties, becomes a much more saleable com-
modity because of the assurance that every stockholder will be able to participate in
working out the organic arrangements for management, control, and profit division.
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a statutory permission for the use of consent restrictions means that direc-
tors or shareholders must act reasonably in passing on the requested right
to transfer.45 Does the Delaware statute mean what it says, that a "con-
sent" restriction may be imposed, or will a "good faith" or "reasonable"
qualification be read into the liberal grant of permission? No convincing
reason exists why the parties should not be allowed to agree to give each
other an absolute, arbitrary control over associates. In the absence of
legislative clarity, the Delaware statute should be read by the courts as
permitting close corporation stockholders to reject a proposed trans-
feree without any possibility of judicial review of the purity of their
motives. If the parties find this arrangement unpalatable, they should be
permitted to plan accordingly. Lesser restrictions, including buy-sell agree-
ments and dissolution power, are possible devices available to them.46
Imposing or eliminating transfer restrictions. The Maryland statutory
scheme offers -a clear guide to planning for transfer restrictions. Reliance
may be placed on the statutory premise of no transfer without consent,
which may be arbitrarily withheld, and on the statutory right to petition
for dissolution which triggers a buy-out option. Alternatively, the parties
may waive the dissolution option by so agreeing,47 giving each a completely
free choice of associates. Or a "good-faith" or "reasonable" criteria for
withholding consent may be agreed upon despite its uncertainties, possibly
using arbitration to resolve any future conflict. In addition, an agreement
with respect to dissolution may be dovetailed with this aspect of the close
corporation agreement. Section 104(a) (2) of the Maryland statute makes
it quite clear, however, that no transfer restrictions may be added or elim-
inated unless by consent of all of the shareholders. This is, of course, as it
should be.
Similarly, under section 202(b) of the Delaware statute it is clearly
impossible to impose a restraint on a stockholder without his consent.
Removal of a transfer condition is another matter. If a restriction is con-
tained in the certificate of incorporation, a majority may be able to ef-
fectuate the removal of the limitation under section 242. The class vote
requirement, however, might give a veto in a particular case.4 8 The Dela-
ware courts seem to have repudiated the "vested right" approach in matters
of this kind.49 Unless a high vote requirement has been agreed upon under
sections 216 or 141(b) or unless the Bechtold rationale is adopted, 50 a
bylaw-imposed restriction presumably is vulnerable to change by director
"See Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuE L. 875, 950.
,
0 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
"MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 101(b) (Supp. 1967).
"See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(d) (2) (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet
1967).
"See Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 A. 255 (1929).
See Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951).
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or shareholder vote, depending on the bylaw provision relating to amend-
ments. If the restriction is embodied in an agreement, hornbook contract
principles should prevent unilateral change. The only provision of the
close corporation subchapter which might have an impact on this problem
is section 354 which sustains certificate provisions, -bylaws, or written
agreements aimed at accomplishing partnership characteristics for the
corporation. While the presence of section 202 may limit reliance on
section 354 in planning for stock transfer restrictions, a court could be
convinced that section 354 permits in the close corporation what is doubt-
ful for corporations at large; namely, consent restrictions which give each
stockholder an altogether untrammeled right to declare proposed trans-
ferees persona non grata. In -addition, this section may affect the question
of elimination of restrictions through bylaw or charter amendment. Un-
fortunately, -the actual language offers little direct support, for there is no
requirement of unanimity for the execution or amendment of these part-
nership-like arrangements.
DISSOLUTION
Shareholder agreements. In Maryland, agreements on rightful disso-
lution by one or more stockholders, at will or upon the occurrence of a
specified contingency, are included in the concise but comprehensive sec-
tion 104 listing of matters upon which the parties -are free to contract on a
unanimous basis. That section and section 355 of the Delaware statute
provide broad options on dissolution as a matter of right when not in con-
travention of the agreement of the parties. The Delaware requirement of
unanimity for an amendment to introduce a dissolution provision is quite
sound and should have been followed consistently. However, the prerequi-
site is somewhat compromised by a provision in section 355(b) that a vote
of two-thirds of all the outstanding stock will suffice if the certificate of
incorporation contains a provision expressly allowing a dissolution amend-
ment on those terms. Theoretically, each stockholder is aware of and fully
comprehends charter provisions, but as a practical matter this is not always
true. If the intended purpose is to guard minority shareholders from un-
wanted dissolution provisions, it would seem preferable to dispense with
the potentially harmful anticipatory consent provision and -give each stock-
holder the protection of a veto exercisable when the question arises. The
Maryland requirement of unanimity to change the close corporation com-
pact, including every aspect of the business association, is the proper way
to handle the matter.
A lingering doubt concerning the extent of contractual freedom on dis-
solution still extends to the question of whether the parties may agree to
the power of "wrongful" dissolution. In the analogous partnership law,
the unilateral termination power grew out of a judicial disinclination to
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coerce parties to remain in unpalatable personal relationships. Yet, some
of the potential harshness of the right of dissolution has been tempered in
the Uniform Partnership Act. While the Act preserves the principle that a
partnership may be dissolved at any time by the express will of any partner
irrespective of a contrary agreement between the partners,51 it is also pro-
vided that the remaining partners may elect to continue the business if they
indemnify the dissolving partner against business-connected liabilities and
pay the dissenter -the value of his interest.52 Similar principles have not
yet been assimilated into corporation law; yet, the statutory separation of
public-issue and close corporations may occasion the question of whether
the partnership law of dissolution should be made available to participants
in the close corporation. It would seem, however, that a power to dissolve
the corporation in disregard of prior agreements by -the parties is not needed
if appropriate alternatives are presented in the governing statutory scheme.
In addition to a sound provision for judicial dissolution, there should be
an express recognition that close corporation associates are free to enter
into any dissolution agreement which may comport with their planning
objectives. The contractual freedom to state in detail when dissolution
will be brought about and to use buy-out agreements with appropriate
valuation and payment procedures will satisfy most needs.
Nonetheless, if the power were given to any stockholder to dissolve in
contravention of the close corporation compact, the power could and cer-
tainly should 'be limited as it is in the analogous partnership situation. An
agreement on a term of existence is intended to 'give associates a right to
permanence of investment. This right requires that -they have the option to
sell the entire 'business and recover damages for a premature dissolution
or to continue the business and pay the dissolving stockholder the book
value of his interest less damages. They should be permitted to petition
the court not only to assess damages and -fix the value of the corporation
but also to order a fair payment period. This would make the exercise of
the dissolution power most unattractive and of minimum pain to non-dis-
solving stockholders. It is believed that, on balance, the statutory power
to dissolve in contravention of the agreement, -hedged as suggested, ought
to be established as a last-ditch escape for a close corporation associate
who desires exit at any price.
Dissolution By Judicial Decree
Maryland: Electing close corporations. Maryland section 109(a) au-
thorizes any shareholder -to petition ,for dissolution on the ground that
internal dissension prevents the conduct of the business to the advantage
of the stockholders generally. Any stockholder or stockholders may elect to
6-See UNIFORM PATNm m AcT § 31(1) (b), (2).
521d. § 38(2)(b).
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avoid dissolution by applying to purchase the petitioner's share at a price
equal to their fair value as fixed by the court. If the section's evident spirit
and intention are properly captured by the courts, judicial dissolution of the
close corporation can be satisfactorily dealt with. However, the problems
besetting dissolution by judicial decree of the close corporation could have
been -reduced even further by also including in the statute a more flexible
judicial power with regard to remedies upon a showing of internal dis-
sension. The English Companies Act provides an example which could
have been copied. Specifically, section 210 of the act authorizes the court,
when a winding-up would unfairly prejudice some members, to fashion any
remedy which will end the complained of conduct.5 3
That the Maryland statute does not define "internal dissension" in the
traditional terms of .the failure to elect directors or the inability of the
board of directors to act is significant. The mere fact that it is possible
somehow for the business to be carried on at a profit does not mean that
there exists the congenial and cooperative environment, marked by the
mutual trust and confidence which should be characteristic of the incorpo-
rated partnership. The breakdown of that environment should mean that
the business "can no longer be conducted to the advantage of 'the stock-
holders generally."-54 The shift in emphasis in 'the Maryland statute from
the benefits of a dissolution to all the stockholders to the advantages to be
derived by all the stockholders from the continued conduct of the business
should serve to distract the courts from the enterprise profitability test. In
addition, it offers a means -for ending the judicial reluctance to disband a
profitable but dissension-plagued close corporation. The analogy to part-
nership principles becomes quite serviceable in the construction of this
judicial dissolution provision. Particularly relevant would be English
precedents which have accepted the logical consequences of viewing the
close corporation as an incorporated partnership. Interpreting the section
of the Companies Act which allows a judicial termination when such would
be "just and equitable," 55 the court in In re Yenidje Tobacco Company,
Limited,56 the leading English case giving expression to the partnership
analogy, felt "bound to say that circumstances which would justify the
winding up of a partnership . . . are circumstances which should induce
the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under the just and equitable clause
and to wind up the company." With support from a treatise on partnership
law, -the court further stated that sufficient cause existed for dissolution of
"Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
' MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 109(a) (Supp. 1967).
Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 222(f).
6 [1916] 2 Ch. 426, 432 (CA.).
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a close corporation which endured "such a state of animosity as precludes
all reasonable hope of reconciliation and friendly cooperation .... ,,57
A question naturally arises over the importance to be given a judicial
dissolution provision in a statute which also has a very liberal provision on
dissolution by agreement of the parties. What weight should the court
give to the fact that the parties have not made use of the privilege to agree
to dissolution at the will of any shareholder or on the happening of speci-
fied events? If easy dissolution has not been agreed to, the court should
first try to ascertain whether the certificate faithfully represents the busi-
ness understanding of the parties. Routine incorporation will be with us
forever and almost always fails to -represent particular "intent" on difficult
questions. The better stance -for a court faced with a routine incorporation
would be -to assume that the associates in a close corporation intended
that partnership rules should apply. Thus, they should not be understood
as having agreed to stay together without exception. Next the court should
ascertain whether the actual intent of the parties is expressed in a "gentle-
men's agreement 58 or a prior partnership agreement which the parties
understand to govern their incorporated existence. It would be regrettable
if the courts were to take the view that a failure to resort to a liberal dis-
solution provision creates a bias against the grant of judicial dissolution,
for the planning alternative which would be forced upon associates would
be the universal use of 'the dissolution at will agreement. Moreover, such
a view would take away a highly desirable planning option-that of re-
jecting too-easy dissolution in favor of arbitration or some other form of
dispute settlement.
Maryland: The election to purchase to avoid dissolution. Under the
Maryland formulation, the election to purchase in section 109(c) is in-
tended as a method of avoiding dissolution. Does this mean that the
election is operative only when the court finds that dissolution is appro-
priate because the business can no longer be conducted to the advantage
of the stockholders generally? Or does it mean that the petitioning share-
holder's stock may be purchased by election prior -to and regardless of the
court's final decision? To some extent, the statute suggests the latter.
Section 109(c) states, for example, that if the parties cannot agree on a
fair price, the court'shall "stay the proceeding" and determine the fair
value. This seems to contemplate an interruption of the dissolution pro-
ceeding. But it is .also possible to understand this provision to mean that
the election and valuation procedure are the second stage of the dissolution
proceeding and come after a decision by the court of equity that the statu-
tory circumstances for dissolution exist. One point seems clear: if the
' Id. at 430, citing N. LNDLEY, PARr NRsip (1860).
61 See DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955); note 19 supra and
text following.
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election may only be made upon the filing of the dissolution petition, -the
statute would have to be regarded as having gone off on a rather odd tack,
providing a means of avoiding any hearing at all on the question of dis-
solution. Surely the non-petitioning stockholders may resist the dissolu-
tion petition on the merits and, if they are unsuccessful, elect a purchase
"to avoid dissolution." Delay cannot benefit purchasers, for section 109(c)
designates the filing date for the petition as the date at which the fair
value is to be fixed and from which interest is to be calculated. In fact,
however, this statutory structure tends to deny the non-petitioning share-
holders their day in court on the dissolution issue.
The Maryland statute should be read as allowing an immediate elec-
tion to purchase by the non-petitioning shareholders. If they are willing
to buy out -the petitioner, no finding of the existence of the statutory re-
quirement for judicial dissolution is necessary. Common sense dictates
that if the petitioner has sought a remedy of dissolution, which is statutor-
ily conditioned -by the right of purchase in other stockholders, the purchase
should not be made subject to a finding that the petitioner is entitled to
dissolution, unless that question is put in issue by the purchasers. Further,
the right of the non-petitioning stockholders to purchase prior to settle-
ment of the dissolution question does not involve an inimical limitation on
the court's discretion to find in favor of the purchasers on the dissolution
question, for -their desire to disassociate themselves with the corporation
can be -fulfilled.
The election to purchase may relieve the minds of those courts who
have shown themselves to be troubled by the blackmail aspects of a dis-
solution petition.59 If a petitioner had been more sinned against than
sinning, a court in the past may 'have nevertheless refused dissolution be-
cause it suspected that the plaintiff was trying to bludgeon the defendant
into a buy-out at an inflated price. A buy-out election at a fair price and
on an installment payment schedule, both fixed by the court, will be a
satisfactory answer in many cases. Where the petitioning stockholder is
also guilty of causing the deadlock or dissension, and the other shareholders
are financially unable to buy, the purchase election gives them no alterna-
tive but to fight the dissolution. The remedy remains discretionary, how-
ever, and -they may persuade the court to withhold dissolution.
Another aspect of this problem arose in a recent Connecticut case. In
Sussman v. Riverbank Motors Corporation60 a holder of fifty percent of
the stock of a corporation filed a dissolution petition alleging an inability
to break a deadlock caused by the equal division of 'the stock. When the
11See, e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954);
Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959). See generally
Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HAv. L. Rnv. 1532 (1960).
60 154 Conn. 289, 224 A.2d 716 (1966).
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other fifty percent stockholder applied to the court to have the fair value
of the petitioner's shares appraised in order to exercise his statutory op-
tion of purchasing the petitioner's shares, 6 ' the petitioner withdrew his pe-
tition forthwith. Since the appraisal and purchase election were found 'to
be ancillary to the dissolution petition, the withdrawal of that petition was
held to require dismissal of the appraisal application. The court believed
that appraisal and purchase were meant by the legislature as a means of
allowing the corporation to be continued and that the withdrawal of the
petition for dissolution accomplished the same result.62 It is possible to
disagree with the court's reading of the legislative intent as requiring an
absolute cut-off of the purchase election. The legislature does not seem
to have been concerned so much with preserving at all cost the corporate
existence as with introducing flexibility into what has been a rigid, dissolu-
tion-or-nothing, judicial proceeding. If the worry is that dissolution is too
drastic and that the threat of it is coercive, the ruling in this case may be
seen as adopting too technical an approach. The statutory purchase appli-
cation may well have assumed that the petitioner will be satisfied with a
buy-out at a fair price, since he has evidenced his lack of interest in internal
resolution of the corporation's difficulties.
Perhaps the statute should be treated as allowing the shareholder who
has not originally asked for dissolution to make out his own case for the
appropriateness of purchase as an alternative method of ending the dis-
sension-racked situation. The stockholder who has not initiated the dis-
solution petition may choose not to resist the allegations of dissension and
may concur in the need for some resolution of the deadlocked situation.
The court might appropriately retain jurisdiction in the matter upon with-
drawal by the original petitioners and allow the applicant for appraisal to
demonstrate the appropriateness of that relief.
Maryland: Non-electing close corporations. The reports are replete
with cases of judicial hesitance to grant dissolution. Statutory efforts to
state criteria for the guidance of the court have mirrored these deep-seated
inhibitions and may not result in a more liberal grant of dissolution. For
example, the New York statute, as amended, probably does not overrule
the leading New York case, In re Radom and Neidorff, Incorporated,63
which stressed the continuing profitability of the corporation there involved
as a major reason for denying dissolution. The court also manifested re-
luctance to have its dissolution-granting discretion exercised in a way
which would benefit one of the stockholders in his campaign to force the
other to sell out at an unfair price. A court's difficulty is compounded
when the facts suggest that dissolution of the corporation in question will
a, See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384(a), (b), (d), (e) (1960).
02 154 Conn. at., 224 A.2d at 718.
03 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 542 (1964).
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be followed by the establishment of a new business by one or some of the
stockholders, to the exclusion of the others, with what amounts to an ap-
propriation of the good will of the existing corporation. In that situation,
freezing the parties in the existing corporation is the only way that a court
can prevent an inequitable result or a forced sale by the weaker stock-
holder. This points up the need for much more flexible remedies for dead-
lock or oppression in the close corporation such as court ordered buy-outs.
Section 79A(a) of the new Maryland statute allows the holder of not
less than twenty-five percent of all the voting shares of any corporation to
petition for dissolution whenever the shareholders are so divided that they
cannot elect directors or the board is so divided respecting management
that board action -is impossible. But section 79A(b) permits any share-
holder to petition for dissolution if the shareholders are so divided that
they have failed for at least two consecutive annual meeting dates to elect
directors. The court's "sound judicial discretion" is specified as the only
criterion for granting dissolution under these circumstances. The question
is thus raised whether this provision should 'be read literally so that dead-
lock-produced non-functioning alone should 'be sufficient to move the court
to exercise its discretion. Since 'the Maryland statute does not restrict the
court by imposing a test based on the benefits of dissolution, the way is
open to the Maryland courts to declare the presence of the jurisdictional
facts of shareholder or board deadlock sufficient to justify the grant of
dissolution, as the Maine courts have already done.64 "If equity so re-
quires," the test under the Maine statute,65 may well become the criterion
for judicial dissolution in Maryland.
Section 79A of the Maryland statute also permits a petition for dis-
solution to be brought by any shareholder on the ground that "the acts of
the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive
or fraudulent. '66 In the non-electing close corporation, arrangements
among less than all of the shareholders may produce intolerable manage-
ment and profit sharing conditions for the minority shareholders. Thus,
this section is vital as an aid to a minority relegated to a non-participating
and non-profit sharing position, since it permits majority power to be ef-
fectively policed. Hopefully, the Maryland courts will agree with the Illi-
nois case, Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Company,67 which held that
the exclusion from a meaningful voice in the control and management of
the enterprise is oppressive under the Illinois statute, a result which is con-
sistent with the principle of equal voice in management recognized in the
6, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 79A(b) (2) (Supp. 1967).
65307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
"See Laskey v. L. & L. Manchester Drive-In, Inc., 216 A.2d 310 (Me. 1966).
20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).
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Uniform Partnership Act68 and which should be incorporated into close
corporation analysis.
Delaware: Judicial dissolution. Earlier in this article many close cor-
poration devices were shown to be available for use in the non-electing
Delaware close corporation. 69 The -use of shareholder or director unani-
mity agreements sharply increases the risk of deadlock and business pa-
ralysis. This is one -reason why -the Delaware statute must address itself
to the problem of dissolution on deadlock in non-electing close corpora-
tions. More importantly, however, the Delaware statute expressly sanc-
tions several devices-shareholder selection of officers and agents, share-
holders voting agreements, voting trusts and irrevocable proxies-which
may be exploited by less than all the shareholders in a way obnoxious to
minority shareholders.
Under two sections of the Delaware statute the Court of Chancery may
appoint a "custodian" for a corporation who, at the Court's direction, may
liquidate the enterprise. Section 226 of ,the Delaware statute allows pe-
titions for appointment by any shareholder on the occasion of shareholder
inability to elect directors. No further criteria for dissolving the entity in
such a circumstance, such as injury to the corporation or unprofitability
of the corporation, -are supplied -to the courts. Does the statute codify
Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Incorporated,70 in which the court,
apparently applying a "profitability" test, refused dissolution to two share-
holders who together held fifty percent of the stock of the corporation but
were shut out from management and profits? While the absence of a test
invites the construction that, if the stockholders cannot choose a governing
body, the corporation ought to be dissolved, the coolness of -the courts to
that step will probably produce reliance on a "profitability" test similar to
that adopted in Paulman.
Section 226 does, however, provide for custodial and dissolution peti-
tions if the business is threatened with irreparable injury because the direc-
tors are so divided that board action is impossible and the shareholders
cannot end the division. It is far from clear why a test of irreparable harm
was thought to be appropriately introduced here when none appears in -the
prior subsection on shareholder deadlock. It would appear to be a far
more serious matter if the board is paralyzed than if -the shareholders can-
not elect successors to directors who, under the statute, remain in office
until their successors are elected. This means, for example, that even
though the board is rendered impotent either because of a high director
vote requirement or an evenly split board membership, actual or threatened
irreparable injury to the corporation must be demonstrated. A sense of
08 UNWORM PARTNmsP Acr § 18(e).
"' See text preceding note 26 supra.
70 37 Del. Ch. 348, 143 A.2d 272 (1958).
proportion requires one to believe that the courts will not be too demand-
ing in this regard.
Section 352 of the Delaware close corporation subchapter authorizes
a petition for the appointment of a custodian if the shareholders are man-
aging the business under section 351 and are divided hopelessly. An ir-
reparable injury test is included in the section, but, as pointed out earlier,
the majority can terminate shareholder management, making its use im-
probable-a fact that seems to make discussion of this provision un-
necessary.
Two sections of the Delaware statute pertain to the appointment of a
provisional director. Under section 353 the Court of Chancery is em-
powered to appoint a provisional director when the board of directors is
so divided that the business of the corporation can no longer 'be conducted
to the advantage of -the stockholders generally. Subsection 352(b) pro-
vides for appointment of 'a provisional director as an -alternative to the
appointment of a custodian. The test to be met for the appointment of a
provisional director under this section is whether, as judicially determined,
"it would be in -the best interest of -the corporation."
This statutory pattern raises a number of perplexing questions. Since
sections 226 and 352 provide for the appointment of 'a custodian upon the
application of 'any shareholder when the board or the shareholders (if they
are managing under section 351) are deadlocked, what is the function of
section 353? That section -allows half of the board or the holder of one-
third of the stock entitled to elect directors (or the holder of two-thirds of
any class of stock entitled to elect directors, if there is more than one class)
to bring a petition for the appointment of a provisional director. Does this
mean that "any shareholder" may ask only for dissolution under the
former two sections, with the appointment of a provisional director a matter
for the court to volunteer if the test of "irreparable injury" is not met?
Yet, surely the section must tolerate petitions by any stockholder for the
appointment of a provisional director, a less drastic remedy than dissolu-
tion, upon the satisfaction of the alternative test -that the best interests of
the corporation would be served 'by something short of dissolution. If
any stockholder may 'ask for the appointment of a provisional director
when, in the face of shareholder or director deadlock, that would be "in
the best interest of 'the corporation," 71 it adds little to the statute to permit
half of the board or certain stockholders to petition for the appointment of
a provisional director only when the board is at an impasse. The appoint-
ment of a provisional director as an alternative to a custodian ,armed with
liquidation authority must have been intended to add flexibility of judicial
relief in a proceeding where dissolution is sought. However, the result
will very probably 'be to make dissolution an almost inaccessible remedy,
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352(b) (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
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If irreparable injury to the corporation is present or threatened, the ap-
pointment of a provisional director may be easily found to be in the best
interests of the corporation by courts -antipathetic to dissolution. So even
if the petitioning stockholder gets over -the irreparable injury hurdle, which
is no mean feat in itself, he is likely to find it very difficult to convince the
court that it would not be better to try the provisional director alternative.
Delaware: "Discontinuance" of a "joint venture" corporation. Dela-
ware corporation law now contains what may be the first recognition of a
new creature-the "joint venture corporation." Section 273 of the Dela-
ware statute allows either stockholder of a two-shareholder, fifty-fifty
owned, "joint venture" corporation to petition for "discontinuance" of the
joint venture. The petitioning stockholder must submit a plan for dis-
continuance and distribution. Presumably, -this plan could call for the
sale of all the stock or assets to a third party or the sale of one share-
holder's stock to the other. Unless both stockholders file either their con-
currence in the submitted plan, or an alternative plan, with the court within
three months, and satisfy the court that -the distribution has been completed
within twelve months, the court may order dissolution.
This section is a curiosity. The solicitude shown for the shareholders
of this species of the close corporation is in sharp contrast to the incom-
plete legislative treatment of dissolution of other close corporations. Yet
the section raises many questions. Why are -these "joint venture" corpora-
tions excused from having to elect close corporation status under section
344 in order to have this liberal discontinuance or dissolution privilege?
Under section 355, the "joint venturers" could agree on dissolution by
either party as a matter of right, on some procedure for the sale of all of
the stock or assets to a third corporation, on the right to tender the shares
to the other for compulsory purchase, or on a right in either to negotiate
a sale of all of the stock on behalf of both. ITmhunerable other exotic
mechanisms could be employed to plan for the discontinuance of a "joint
venture" corporation under the broad dissolution privilege of section 355.
Is a "joint venture corporation" one having a narrow business purpose and
for a rather limited term?72 Is it a corporation formed by two corporations
otherwise not associated .and both of whom are occupied with separate sub-
stantial corporate activities? May the stockholders be -two natural persons
not otherwise associated professionally or in business, both elsewhere sub-
stantially involved in separate occupations? Because of these uncertainties,
is it wise to provide that all two-shareholder, fifty-ifty owned corporations
are "engaged in the prosecution of -a joint venture" under the corporate
form and hence are entitled to use this provision?
" But see Comment, The Joint Venture: Problem Child of Partnership, 38 CAIW.
L. REv. 860 (1950).
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The joint-venture of the public-issue corporation world, involving two
large corporations as the fifty-fifty stockholders, is unquestionably the in-
tended beneficiary of this section. When sophisticated corporate managers
cannot get along in a highly depersonalized joint venture deal, the statute
provides them with an easy exit. Surely, the legislative intention is not a
very niggardly exercise of discretion in granting discontinuance or dissolu-
tion by the Court of Chancery. The message is plain enough. These cor-
porations want -to be able to have partition or sale rather than endure a
situation where the two stockholders are "unable to agree upon the desira-
bility of discontinuing such joint venture and disposing of the assets. '73
The section exemplifies the conviction of -those who form and advise such
corporations that, if the corporate partners -are unable to get along har-
moniously, divorce is the only sensible and civilized thing to do. This
same sentiment, however, should be applied .to the dose corporation whose
shareholders number two or seven and whose ownership interests -are split
other than fifty-fifty.
Of course, it is true that the end of the affair for -the joint venture
corporation whose -two shareholders are listed among the Fortune Maga-
zine "500" can usually be readily handled in terms of dividing the prop-
erty, by sale of assets or stock, or by (a buy-out of one partner by the other.
The feasibility of -the petition for discontinuance in the case of lesser en-
dowed corporations or persons is in direct ratio to the feasibility or likeli-
hood of any plan for discontinuance by sale of stock or assets. Liquida-
tion in the sense of an -actual dismantling -and auction sale is highly unlikely
to be the form of discontinuance of the corporations for whose special
purposes section 273 was enacted. Yet, it may be the only alternative in
the more prevalent close corporations -to which the close corporation sub-
chapter is directed.
OTHER CLOSE CORPORATION PROBLEMS
The legal significance of the document containing the agreement. Dela-
ware and Maryland -require a charter of certificate provision to identify
the close corporation. While Maryland's requirement is met by a mere
charter statement that the corporation is close, 74 Delaware requires such
a statement plus a limitation on the number of shareholders, restrictions on
transfers, and a disavowal of "public" stock offerings.75 In Maryland,
stockholder agreements involving management, stock transfer restrictions,
dissolution, voting, employment, directorships, dividends, or division of
profits may be embodied, pursuant to the authorization of section 104(a),
in .the charter, bylaws, or written instrument. A charter provision, how-
7 3 DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (a) (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
7 MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, § 100 (Supp. 1967).
75 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 342, 343 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
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ever, is needed to install management by direct stockholder action.76 Dela-
ware similarly requires the certificate to house the agreement on stockholder
management, 77 and requires that the agreement be stated on each stock
certificate,78 but then expressly permits the partnership-like agreement to
be in -the certificate, bylaws, or separate written agreement,79 and says
nothing about where agreements which restrict the discretion of the board
of directors must or may be found.
These disparities seem unnecessarily creative of legal tangles. The law
should embrace the idea that the articles of close incorporation, like articles
of partnership, are the contract of the parties. Regulation of the privilege
of limited liability and separate entity status require putting some matters
on record. Yet, control, profit sharing, arbitration, and dissolution on
stock transfer arrangements do not appear to require public filing, for the
investor can be protected in other ways.
Financial provisions. Apart from the Maryland provisions banning
new stock issues without unanimous shareholder consent80 and prohibiting
voting senior securities,8 ' neither statute takes up the financial problems of
the close corporation against the background of traditional rules on con-
sideration for stock, dividend or share purchase regulations, excessive com-
pensation, and other similar areas of corporate law. For example, the
statutory prohibition against use of a promissory note or the promise of
future services as valid consideration for stock is preserved in both stat-
utes.82 A persuasively supported recommendation for a change on this
point has been ignored.83
Limited liability. As familiar corporate trappings are released by the
use of the provisions of close corporation statutes, the danger remains that
courts will be too prone to impose personal liability on the close corpora-
tion shareholders. Even now this is done in excess by resort to long-dis-
credited "tests" for "piercing the corporate veil" too numerous and irra-
tional to be worthy of comment here. Even the most harmless suggestions
for close corporation reforms have been met by the not unreasonable ob-
jection that courts may use the parties' failure to behave in traditional cor-
71 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 105(a) (Supp. 1967).17 DEL. CoDE ANN. fit. 8, § 351 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967).
70 Id. § 354.
SO MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 102(a) (Supp. 1967).
1" Id. § 102(b).
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Spec. General Corp. Law Pamphlet 1967);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 22(a) (1966).
" Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization
of a Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1098 (1962).
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porate fashion as a pretext for saddling associates with unlimited personal
liability.84
While just and equitable limitations must be placed upon the limited
liability mechanism, fundamental questions are begged by the literal en-
forcement of a "rule" that capital reasonably sufficient to meet anticipated
obligations must 'be devoted to the business. Creditors, of course, are free
to negotiate the terms upon which they will deal with the corporation. Thus,
if a question exists as to the -probable success of ,the venture, the creditors
should insist upon an appropriate security for their advances or upon a
personal guarantee of payment from shareholders. Because of this con-
tractual freedom end the opportunity for prior investigation into the sta-
bility of an enterprise, creditors should not be entitled to a judicial inquiry
into -the "reasonableness" of the capitalization of -the corporation. While
creditors deserve protection against deception land unfair dealing, they are
risk-takers in much the same sense as shareholders, for the creditors make
their commitments in hopes that the operation will generate sufficient earn-
ings to satisfy their claims. Consequently, except in cases where a sensible
weighing of all the facts indicates a real abuse or perversion of the corpo-
rate privilege, courts ought to be constrained by statute from refusing to
enforce limited liability principles. A statute might well provide:
The existence of the corporation as a legal entity distinct from its
shareholders and the shareholders' privilege of limited liability shall not
be affected by the fact that the affairs of the corporation are directly
managed by the shareholders; nor by the fact that the board of directors
of the corporation are parties to agreements respecting the exercise of
their powers; nor by the fact that lawful restrictions are imposed upon
the transfer of the stock of the corporation. In the absence of actual fraud,
persons who voluntarily engage in any kind of dealings or transactions
with a corporation, on a corporate basis, may look only to the assets of
the corporation for the satisfaction of claims arising out of those dealings
or transactions.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the draftsmen of the Maryland statute to attempt a
fresh approach to the writing of a close corporation statute was a com-
mendable one. The skill they brought to the execution of that decision is
witnessed by the clarity and coherence of the series of provisions. Above
all, the policy decisions, especially the insistence on unanimity, exemplified
by this excellent legislation are sound and accomplish a large part of the
appropriate objectives for legislation of this kind. In -general, its directness,
economy, and lucidity of style, as well -as its substantive coherence, stamp
the Maryland statute as the best close corporation statute to date. The
legislation should have gone -further, however, and compelled compliance
81 See, e.g., Garrett, John Doe Incorporates Himself, 19 Bus. LAWYER 535 (1964).
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to certain key provisions by all close corporations. This would have re-
quired a definition of the close corporation which specifies more than the
voluntary election to be such a corporation. A definition tied to the num-
ber of shareholders would have served this purpose wen.85
Although the Delaware close corporation subchapter equips sharehold-
ers with -a wide variety of useful planning arrangements, it lacks overall
clarity because so many "close corporation" arrangements remain open to
the non-electing corporation. Questionable policy choices were made by
sanctioning less than unanimous agreements and alliances, not only with
respect to non-electing corporations, 'but in electing or statutory close cor-
porations as well. Further, while the statute adopts a definition of the
close corporation, the definition is not used to enforce compliance with
any provision but rather to limit use of the provisions which happen to be
placed in the close corporation subehapter. Yet, ,this is not in fact terribly
confining, for the use of close corporation devices in all corporations is
liberally provided for elsewhere in -the statute.
Hopefully, however, experience under these statutes will speed realiza-
tion of the ultimate quest-a distinct and unchallengeable model close
corporation statute.
11 See Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need For More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. LJ. 1145, 1189-91, 1196 (1966).
